Somalia Resources
Transitional Justice in Clan-Based Societies: The Case Study of Somalia
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
January 2024
Transitional justice promotes a culture of accountability, mends ruptured trust between communities, and fosters a shared national identity. Confronting Transitional justice promotes a culture of accountability, mends ruptured trust between communities and fosters a shared national identity. Confronting the past directly, Somalia can construct a future anchored in justice, equality, and social cohesion. This effort represents a collective societal determination to confront the enduring legacies of violence, laying the cornerstone for a more peaceful and stable future.This report seeks to explore the implementation of transitional justice in Somalia. It will examine the history and development of the concept, drawing on the experiences of transitional justice in various African contexts. By analyzing the practice of transitional justice in similar settings, the aim is to craft a tailored approach that suits Somalia’s unique social, historical, and political structurethe past directly, Somalia can construct a future anchored in justice, equality, and social cohesion. This effort represents a collective societal determination to confront the enduring legacies of violence, laying the cornerstone for a more peaceful and stable future.
Women’s Perceptions of Governance and Democratization in the Banadir Region: Challenges and Opportunities
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
December 2023
In recent decades, Somalia has made progress toward rebuilding its government since the collapse of the state in 1991. However, many segments of the population remain disenfranchised from the peacebuilding process. Women make up half of the population, but are underrepresented in governance, state-building, and conflict resolution efforts. Studies on women’s participation in post-conflict societies show that they play an important role in ending conflicts and in the transition to democracy. Women in Somalia have made considerable contributions to the reconstruction of their society after the civil war, but there are many obstacles that make it difficult for them to participate in formal institutions. This report examines women’s perspectives on governance, state-building, and conflict resolution in Somalia’s Benadir region. This study employed participatory action research (PAR), a method that involves researchers and participants in the research processes in order to understand the condition and challenges facing the target communities in order to make a positive change. PAR is a context-specific approach that aims to address marginalization, gender inequality, and social injustice in general in ways that help promote democracy and citizens’ participation and involvement in governance and public life. PAR also aims to have a greater awareness of the communities in their situation in order to take relevant action.
Promoting diaspora investment in fragile settings: The case of Somalia
Guido Lanfranchi, Clingendael Institute
August 2023
This policy brief analyses the extent to which diaspora investment can support economic development and livelihoods, with a particular focus on fragile settings. Using the case study of Somalia, the brief explores some of the main advantages and risks associated with this tool. On the one hand, diaspora investment can channel finance into productive activities in the diaspora’s country of origin, supporting the creation of revenue streams, while also generating returns for diaspora investors. On the other hand, particularly in fragile settings, these investments can also undermine social cohesion and even increase the likelihood of violent conflict, especially if they are channelled along identity lines.
On the basis of this analysis, the brief offers the following recommendations to donor governments interested in promoting diaspora investment in Somalia and beyond:
(i) to ensure effectiveness, donors should gather comprehensive, in-depth data on the needs and preferences of both potential investors in the diaspora and investees in the country of origin;
(ii) to avoid exacerbating tensions and conflict, donors should be as inclusive and transparent as possible in their engagement with stakeholders, most notably in the selection of beneficiaries;
(iii) any efforts to promote diaspora investment in fragile settings should be grounded in a thorough understanding of the specific context in which they are implemented, in order to understand both the economic and political implications of such investment.
Playing the long game: Exploring the relationship between Al-Shabab and civilians in areas beyond state control
Mohamed Mubarak, Ashley Jackson
Al-Shabab’s relationship with civilians is crucial for its survival. This research paper, co-published with the Hiraal Institute and ODI, is based on extensive interviews with civilians living in areas of Al-Shabab influence and those close to the group. It explores how the group exploits civilian frustration with political exclusion and government neglect. In the areas it controls, it also provides public goods (such as security and justice) and allows civilians a degree of influence over how Al-Shabab governs. At the same time, civilians, particularly clan elders, use whatever leverage they can to extract benefits from Al-Shabab. Their influence over Al-Shabab depends on many factors such as clan unity and the strategic or military value of a given community to Al-Shabab.
Despite recent losses in territory, Al-Shabab is strategically retreating and playing the long game, betting on the government's inability to maintain control over the long term. Al-Shabab's deep entrenchment in local politics and clan structures, underscores the need for a comprehensive political, governance, and reconciliation strategy to establish long-term stability.
June 2023
Locked and Loaded: The Dangers of Prematurely Lifting the Somali Arms Embargo
Hiraal Institute
This report presents an in-depth examination of the potential consequences of lifting the arms embargo in Somalia. With a focus on both the national and international implications, our findings suggest caution and a nuanced approach towards this crucial policy decision. Somalia’s complex societal structure, characterized by deep-seated clan loyalties, presents a significant challenge. The Somali National Army (SNA), essentially comprised of clan militias, raises concerns that lifting the embargo could fuel inter-clan conflicts, especially as the government has promoted clan militias since August 2023. Such an action could potentially ignite a volatile arms race among the clans, escalating violence, and instability.
The fact that the Somali government does not fully control all its ports of entry further complicates the situation. Without comprehensive oversight of these crucial trade nodes, the risk of arms being diverted to non-state actors, criminal syndicates, or potential adversaries is heightened. This underlines the need for effective management of borders before any changes in the arms embargo policy. Our analysis emphasizes the need for a nuanced and cautious approach towards the arms embargo issue. Strengthening Somalia’s capacity in arms control, securing ports of entry, and promoting effective governance must be prioritized before any significant changes to the current policy.
April 2023
Porous bunker: Private security contractors and the plasticity of Mogadishu’s international ‘green zone’
Jethro Norman
First published online April 20, 2023
From Baghdad’s ‘Emerald City’ to Kabul’s ‘Kabubble’, international green zones have been characterized as ‘bunkerized’ and temporary. Despite efforts to make these spaces appear sealed, they are more porous than we assume. Drawing on fieldwork in Mogadishu and research with private security contractors, this article reconceptualizes international enclaves in terms of their inherent plasticity, moulded by the mobilities, intentions and bureaucracies of those within. The article illustrates the heterogenous sociospatial relations within Mogadishu’s green zone, arguing that it is sustained through internal frictions and transgressive spatial practices that are not captured by the bunkerization motif. The limits of bunkerization are revealed most starkly through the work of security contractors who enjoy greater mobility and access to information than many of the green zone’s transient international workers. They assume the gatekeeper role, sustaining conditions of manageable insecurity by ordering the messy sociopolitical space of the city into bounded zones. Beyond the façade of the enclave, however, their mobility is reliant on ‘local’ Somali partners navigating the complexities of Mogadishu on their behalf. As an interface between the secure inside and the dangerous outside, some contractors have emerged as opportunistic power-brokers connecting Somali entrepreneurs on the outside to the resources within.
Conventional Insurgents: Understanding al-Shabaab’s Mass Attacks against African Union Bases in Somalia
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Paul D. Williams
More African Union (AU) peacekeepers have been killed in Somalia than any other modern peace operation. It is likely that over 450 of them were killed during al-Shabaab mass attacks on the AU’s forward operating bases (FOBs) in south-central Somalia, principally between June 2015 and January 2017. Based on a comparative analysis of six such battles, this article identifies the main factors that account for both the peacekeepers’ vulnerabilities and al-Shabaab’s military successes. It concludes by drawing lessons for peace operations beyond Somalia that might face similar threats from insurgents.
March 2023
The ‘Off-Ramp’ From al-Shabaab: Disengagement During the Ongoing Offensive in Somalia
James Khalil, Martine Zeuthen
Al-Shabaab has been evicted – at least temporarily – from scores of Somali towns and villages since last summer. This includes strategic locations such as Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle, just north of Mogadishu, which had remained under the control of the group for most of the past fifteen years. These events began in June 2022 when al-Shabaab effectively broke a truce with the Ali Mahaweyne sub-clan of the Hawaadle by killing one of its prominent elders. Compounded by famine and al-Shabaab’s increasingly harsh ‘taxation’ policies, what initiated as a low-level mobilisation against the group, soon evolved into proactive efforts to recover territory, with other clan militias then also becoming involved. This ‘organic’ uprising coincided with the reinstatement of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in his second term as Somalia’s President. Seizing his opportunity, President Mohamud declared a “total war against al-Shabaab,” and deployed Somali National Army (SNA) forces in support of the clans in the states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. International actors such as the US, UK, EU, Eritrea, and Turkey have also provided various forms of support, including training for the SNA, police, and other security agencies.
October 2022
Things Fall Apart: Soviet Assistance to the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–1977
Journal of African Military History
Whitney Grespin and Matthew Marchese
As Cold War tensions rose, Soviet aid was offered to the nascent Somali government in pursuit of broader geopolitical machinations that were seen to supersede Somali interests, laying the groundwork for a decades-long mismatch between local intentions and Cold War superpower objectives in the Horn of Africa. Vast quantities of materiel and training were provided to Somalia from 1960 onwards, and by 1976 Somalia boasted a 22,000-man army and was the fourth most heavily armed nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, largely due to Soviet largesse. One year later, the Soviets were expelled and the assistance ceased, having left Somalia with an unsustainable, corrupt, and repressive security structure as a direct result of high levels of foreign assistance that were not well coordinated with host nation sustainment capabilities.
April 2022
Powering Ahead: The United Nations and Somalia’s Renewable Energy Opportunity
The Stimson Center
Somalia has faced a daunting set of challenges since the collapse of the state more than 30 years ago. Efforts to gradually reestablish state authority and a ruling government have evolved through fits and starts since the late 2000s, with climate change and the emergence of the al-Shabab insurgency playing an increasingly visible role in the last 15 years and adding to insecurity. This report examines the evolution of the energy sector in Somalia, one of the least electrified countries in the world, and its role in the country’s political, economic, and conflict dynamics. The study reviews the energy practices of the missions deployed by the UN and the African Union. Collectively, these missions, which represent the principal points of engagement by the international community in Somalia, are responsible for enormous energy supply and demand throughout the country. The research highlights the recent power purchase agreement signed between the UN Support Office in Somalia and a commercial renewable-energy developer in Baidoa. This approach, innovative for the UN, provides a replicable and scalable model to meet UN climate targets, while increasing local energy access that could offer a range of peace and development benefits in Somalia.
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
January 2024
Transitional justice promotes a culture of accountability, mends ruptured trust between communities, and fosters a shared national identity. Confronting Transitional justice promotes a culture of accountability, mends ruptured trust between communities and fosters a shared national identity. Confronting the past directly, Somalia can construct a future anchored in justice, equality, and social cohesion. This effort represents a collective societal determination to confront the enduring legacies of violence, laying the cornerstone for a more peaceful and stable future.This report seeks to explore the implementation of transitional justice in Somalia. It will examine the history and development of the concept, drawing on the experiences of transitional justice in various African contexts. By analyzing the practice of transitional justice in similar settings, the aim is to craft a tailored approach that suits Somalia’s unique social, historical, and political structurethe past directly, Somalia can construct a future anchored in justice, equality, and social cohesion. This effort represents a collective societal determination to confront the enduring legacies of violence, laying the cornerstone for a more peaceful and stable future.
Women’s Perceptions of Governance and Democratization in the Banadir Region: Challenges and Opportunities
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
December 2023
In recent decades, Somalia has made progress toward rebuilding its government since the collapse of the state in 1991. However, many segments of the population remain disenfranchised from the peacebuilding process. Women make up half of the population, but are underrepresented in governance, state-building, and conflict resolution efforts. Studies on women’s participation in post-conflict societies show that they play an important role in ending conflicts and in the transition to democracy. Women in Somalia have made considerable contributions to the reconstruction of their society after the civil war, but there are many obstacles that make it difficult for them to participate in formal institutions. This report examines women’s perspectives on governance, state-building, and conflict resolution in Somalia’s Benadir region. This study employed participatory action research (PAR), a method that involves researchers and participants in the research processes in order to understand the condition and challenges facing the target communities in order to make a positive change. PAR is a context-specific approach that aims to address marginalization, gender inequality, and social injustice in general in ways that help promote democracy and citizens’ participation and involvement in governance and public life. PAR also aims to have a greater awareness of the communities in their situation in order to take relevant action.
Promoting diaspora investment in fragile settings: The case of Somalia
Guido Lanfranchi, Clingendael Institute
August 2023
This policy brief analyses the extent to which diaspora investment can support economic development and livelihoods, with a particular focus on fragile settings. Using the case study of Somalia, the brief explores some of the main advantages and risks associated with this tool. On the one hand, diaspora investment can channel finance into productive activities in the diaspora’s country of origin, supporting the creation of revenue streams, while also generating returns for diaspora investors. On the other hand, particularly in fragile settings, these investments can also undermine social cohesion and even increase the likelihood of violent conflict, especially if they are channelled along identity lines.
On the basis of this analysis, the brief offers the following recommendations to donor governments interested in promoting diaspora investment in Somalia and beyond:
(i) to ensure effectiveness, donors should gather comprehensive, in-depth data on the needs and preferences of both potential investors in the diaspora and investees in the country of origin;
(ii) to avoid exacerbating tensions and conflict, donors should be as inclusive and transparent as possible in their engagement with stakeholders, most notably in the selection of beneficiaries;
(iii) any efforts to promote diaspora investment in fragile settings should be grounded in a thorough understanding of the specific context in which they are implemented, in order to understand both the economic and political implications of such investment.
Playing the long game: Exploring the relationship between Al-Shabab and civilians in areas beyond state control
Mohamed Mubarak, Ashley Jackson
Al-Shabab’s relationship with civilians is crucial for its survival. This research paper, co-published with the Hiraal Institute and ODI, is based on extensive interviews with civilians living in areas of Al-Shabab influence and those close to the group. It explores how the group exploits civilian frustration with political exclusion and government neglect. In the areas it controls, it also provides public goods (such as security and justice) and allows civilians a degree of influence over how Al-Shabab governs. At the same time, civilians, particularly clan elders, use whatever leverage they can to extract benefits from Al-Shabab. Their influence over Al-Shabab depends on many factors such as clan unity and the strategic or military value of a given community to Al-Shabab.
Despite recent losses in territory, Al-Shabab is strategically retreating and playing the long game, betting on the government's inability to maintain control over the long term. Al-Shabab's deep entrenchment in local politics and clan structures, underscores the need for a comprehensive political, governance, and reconciliation strategy to establish long-term stability.
June 2023
Locked and Loaded: The Dangers of Prematurely Lifting the Somali Arms Embargo
Hiraal Institute
This report presents an in-depth examination of the potential consequences of lifting the arms embargo in Somalia. With a focus on both the national and international implications, our findings suggest caution and a nuanced approach towards this crucial policy decision. Somalia’s complex societal structure, characterized by deep-seated clan loyalties, presents a significant challenge. The Somali National Army (SNA), essentially comprised of clan militias, raises concerns that lifting the embargo could fuel inter-clan conflicts, especially as the government has promoted clan militias since August 2023. Such an action could potentially ignite a volatile arms race among the clans, escalating violence, and instability.
The fact that the Somali government does not fully control all its ports of entry further complicates the situation. Without comprehensive oversight of these crucial trade nodes, the risk of arms being diverted to non-state actors, criminal syndicates, or potential adversaries is heightened. This underlines the need for effective management of borders before any changes in the arms embargo policy. Our analysis emphasizes the need for a nuanced and cautious approach towards the arms embargo issue. Strengthening Somalia’s capacity in arms control, securing ports of entry, and promoting effective governance must be prioritized before any significant changes to the current policy.
April 2023
Porous bunker: Private security contractors and the plasticity of Mogadishu’s international ‘green zone’
Jethro Norman
First published online April 20, 2023
From Baghdad’s ‘Emerald City’ to Kabul’s ‘Kabubble’, international green zones have been characterized as ‘bunkerized’ and temporary. Despite efforts to make these spaces appear sealed, they are more porous than we assume. Drawing on fieldwork in Mogadishu and research with private security contractors, this article reconceptualizes international enclaves in terms of their inherent plasticity, moulded by the mobilities, intentions and bureaucracies of those within. The article illustrates the heterogenous sociospatial relations within Mogadishu’s green zone, arguing that it is sustained through internal frictions and transgressive spatial practices that are not captured by the bunkerization motif. The limits of bunkerization are revealed most starkly through the work of security contractors who enjoy greater mobility and access to information than many of the green zone’s transient international workers. They assume the gatekeeper role, sustaining conditions of manageable insecurity by ordering the messy sociopolitical space of the city into bounded zones. Beyond the façade of the enclave, however, their mobility is reliant on ‘local’ Somali partners navigating the complexities of Mogadishu on their behalf. As an interface between the secure inside and the dangerous outside, some contractors have emerged as opportunistic power-brokers connecting Somali entrepreneurs on the outside to the resources within.
Conventional Insurgents: Understanding al-Shabaab’s Mass Attacks against African Union Bases in Somalia
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Paul D. Williams
More African Union (AU) peacekeepers have been killed in Somalia than any other modern peace operation. It is likely that over 450 of them were killed during al-Shabaab mass attacks on the AU’s forward operating bases (FOBs) in south-central Somalia, principally between June 2015 and January 2017. Based on a comparative analysis of six such battles, this article identifies the main factors that account for both the peacekeepers’ vulnerabilities and al-Shabaab’s military successes. It concludes by drawing lessons for peace operations beyond Somalia that might face similar threats from insurgents.
March 2023
The ‘Off-Ramp’ From al-Shabaab: Disengagement During the Ongoing Offensive in Somalia
James Khalil, Martine Zeuthen
Al-Shabaab has been evicted – at least temporarily – from scores of Somali towns and villages since last summer. This includes strategic locations such as Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle, just north of Mogadishu, which had remained under the control of the group for most of the past fifteen years. These events began in June 2022 when al-Shabaab effectively broke a truce with the Ali Mahaweyne sub-clan of the Hawaadle by killing one of its prominent elders. Compounded by famine and al-Shabaab’s increasingly harsh ‘taxation’ policies, what initiated as a low-level mobilisation against the group, soon evolved into proactive efforts to recover territory, with other clan militias then also becoming involved. This ‘organic’ uprising coincided with the reinstatement of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in his second term as Somalia’s President. Seizing his opportunity, President Mohamud declared a “total war against al-Shabaab,” and deployed Somali National Army (SNA) forces in support of the clans in the states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. International actors such as the US, UK, EU, Eritrea, and Turkey have also provided various forms of support, including training for the SNA, police, and other security agencies.
October 2022
Things Fall Apart: Soviet Assistance to the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–1977
Journal of African Military History
Whitney Grespin and Matthew Marchese
As Cold War tensions rose, Soviet aid was offered to the nascent Somali government in pursuit of broader geopolitical machinations that were seen to supersede Somali interests, laying the groundwork for a decades-long mismatch between local intentions and Cold War superpower objectives in the Horn of Africa. Vast quantities of materiel and training were provided to Somalia from 1960 onwards, and by 1976 Somalia boasted a 22,000-man army and was the fourth most heavily armed nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, largely due to Soviet largesse. One year later, the Soviets were expelled and the assistance ceased, having left Somalia with an unsustainable, corrupt, and repressive security structure as a direct result of high levels of foreign assistance that were not well coordinated with host nation sustainment capabilities.
April 2022
Powering Ahead: The United Nations and Somalia’s Renewable Energy Opportunity
The Stimson Center
Somalia has faced a daunting set of challenges since the collapse of the state more than 30 years ago. Efforts to gradually reestablish state authority and a ruling government have evolved through fits and starts since the late 2000s, with climate change and the emergence of the al-Shabab insurgency playing an increasingly visible role in the last 15 years and adding to insecurity. This report examines the evolution of the energy sector in Somalia, one of the least electrified countries in the world, and its role in the country’s political, economic, and conflict dynamics. The study reviews the energy practices of the missions deployed by the UN and the African Union. Collectively, these missions, which represent the principal points of engagement by the international community in Somalia, are responsible for enormous energy supply and demand throughout the country. The research highlights the recent power purchase agreement signed between the UN Support Office in Somalia and a commercial renewable-energy developer in Baidoa. This approach, innovative for the UN, provides a replicable and scalable model to meet UN climate targets, while increasing local energy access that could offer a range of peace and development benefits in Somalia.
Films
The Somali Project (~120 mins)
"The Project tells the story of a private militia formed to fight Somali pirates who prey on some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes."
The Green Gold of Africa
Most Somali men chew the Khat leaf, a natural amphetamine. And in Britain there is one man 90,000 chewers despise. This is the story of the Somali activist who virtually on his own, brought about the UK banning of the leaf. The docimentary charts the billion dollar global Khat industry, travelling to the heartlands of its production, the markets where hundreds of tons are sold daily and back to the campaign on the streets of London.
Somalia: The Forgotten Story (2 part; ~45 mins each) November 2016 The story of Somalia's decline from stability to chaos and the problems facing its people at home and abroad.
Al Shabaab Scholarship |
- Women and Al Shabaab's Insurgency. ICG. 2019.
Al-Shabaab’s Assassinations: Investigating the Uniqueness of Al-Shabaab’s Assassinations via Suicide Bombing
Ellen Chapin, Stephanie Lizzo & Jason Warner
Published online: 08 Sep 2021
In the study of terrorism, assassinations and suicide bombings have most commonly been considered as distinct phenomena. In practice, however, Al-Shabaab has shown a proclivity to use suicide bombings precisely as a means of assassination. But just how unique – if at all – is its use of suicide bombing assassinations (SBAs)? Using three unique databases on African suicide bombing combined with data from the Global Terrorism Database, this article seeks to understand the degree of uniqueness of Al-Shabaab’s SBA efforts from 2006 to 2020. In comparing Al-Shabaab to its nearest analogues – Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – across five different SBA metrics, this article demonstrates how Al-Shabaab is indeed rightly considered to be unique in its tendency to use suicide bombings as a tool for assassinations, at least on the African continent. It concludes by considering just what rationales underlie this proclivity, focusing on group-specific and environmental factors.
Ellen Chapin, Stephanie Lizzo & Jason Warner
Published online: 08 Sep 2021
In the study of terrorism, assassinations and suicide bombings have most commonly been considered as distinct phenomena. In practice, however, Al-Shabaab has shown a proclivity to use suicide bombings precisely as a means of assassination. But just how unique – if at all – is its use of suicide bombing assassinations (SBAs)? Using three unique databases on African suicide bombing combined with data from the Global Terrorism Database, this article seeks to understand the degree of uniqueness of Al-Shabaab’s SBA efforts from 2006 to 2020. In comparing Al-Shabaab to its nearest analogues – Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – across five different SBA metrics, this article demonstrates how Al-Shabaab is indeed rightly considered to be unique in its tendency to use suicide bombings as a tool for assassinations, at least on the African continent. It concludes by considering just what rationales underlie this proclivity, focusing on group-specific and environmental factors.
Worth many sins: Al-Shabaab’s shifting relationship with Kenyan women
Katharine Petrich & Phoebe Donnelly
Pages 1169-1192 | Accepted 17 Jun 2019, Published online: 19 Sep 2019
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335939046_Worth_many_sins_Al-Shabaab's_shifting_relationship_with_Kenyan_women
ABSTRACT: What happens when the world’s ‘oldest profession’ interacts with history’s oldest form of war? In the Horn of Africa, a symbiotic relationship between prostitutes and terrorists has emerged, illuminating critical information about the group’s ideology and strategy. In this article, we argue that al-Shabaab’s differential treatment of Somali and other East African women reveals the group’s strategic focus on Somalia, despite its claims to be a globally focused Islamic extremist organization. Through original ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya, the authors explore al-Shabaab’s deliberate relationships with different groups of women and explain how this helps scholars better understand the group. This article suggests the next phase of scholarship on gender and terrorism, encouraging scholars not only to pay attention to the relationship between women and terrorist groups, but to also examine the nuanced relationships between different categories of women and terrorist groups.
KEYWORDS: Al-Shabaab, terrorism, prostitution, gender, Kenya
Katharine Petrich & Phoebe Donnelly
Pages 1169-1192 | Accepted 17 Jun 2019, Published online: 19 Sep 2019
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335939046_Worth_many_sins_Al-Shabaab's_shifting_relationship_with_Kenyan_women
ABSTRACT: What happens when the world’s ‘oldest profession’ interacts with history’s oldest form of war? In the Horn of Africa, a symbiotic relationship between prostitutes and terrorists has emerged, illuminating critical information about the group’s ideology and strategy. In this article, we argue that al-Shabaab’s differential treatment of Somali and other East African women reveals the group’s strategic focus on Somalia, despite its claims to be a globally focused Islamic extremist organization. Through original ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya, the authors explore al-Shabaab’s deliberate relationships with different groups of women and explain how this helps scholars better understand the group. This article suggests the next phase of scholarship on gender and terrorism, encouraging scholars not only to pay attention to the relationship between women and terrorist groups, but to also examine the nuanced relationships between different categories of women and terrorist groups.
KEYWORDS: Al-Shabaab, terrorism, prostitution, gender, Kenya
Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab’s Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa
Katharine Petrich, October 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873?af=R&journalCode=uter20&journalCode=uter20
ABSTRACT: Contrary to historical terrorism scholarship, terrorist groups can strategically diversify into a variety of criminal activities without losing their core ideology or support among the civilian population. This pattern is demonstrated by the evolutionary arc of al-Shabaab, which grew from a small subset of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union to the most violent political actor in the Horn of Africa, able to conduct terrorist attacks as far afield as Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab has been highly successful in creating a narrative of truth and justice provision while simultaneously exploiting the Somali population and engaging in criminal activity. For the group, criminal activity and crime networks serve two primary purposes: as a funding mechanism and as an avenue for recruitment. Using ethnographic fieldwork and process tracing, I find that the group’s criminal activities throughout the Horn of Africa have made the group significantly more resilient to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns, extending both its lifespan and operational capability.
Katharine Petrich, October 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873?af=R&journalCode=uter20&journalCode=uter20
ABSTRACT: Contrary to historical terrorism scholarship, terrorist groups can strategically diversify into a variety of criminal activities without losing their core ideology or support among the civilian population. This pattern is demonstrated by the evolutionary arc of al-Shabaab, which grew from a small subset of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union to the most violent political actor in the Horn of Africa, able to conduct terrorist attacks as far afield as Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab has been highly successful in creating a narrative of truth and justice provision while simultaneously exploiting the Somali population and engaging in criminal activity. For the group, criminal activity and crime networks serve two primary purposes: as a funding mechanism and as an avenue for recruitment. Using ethnographic fieldwork and process tracing, I find that the group’s criminal activities throughout the Horn of Africa have made the group significantly more resilient to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns, extending both its lifespan and operational capability.
RUSI: Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for Former Members of Al-Shabaab
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190104_whr_4-18_deradicalisation_and_disengagement_in_somalia_web.pdf
THE SERENDI REHABILITATION centre in Mogadishu offers support to ‘low-risk’ former members of Al-Shabaab to prepare them for reintegration into the community, as part of the wider strategy of the Federal Government of Somalia and its international partners to counter the organisation. While certain challenges remain, between 2015 and 2018 Serendi was gradually converted into a functional centre in terms of its conditions and services offered. As such,
the implementing team has now additionally been tasked with supporting both outreach (messaging campaigns to encourage additional disengagements from Al-Shabaab, as well as other related activities) and community reintegration of beneficiaries after leaving the centre.
This report presents detailed information about the Serendi programme, as well as wider empirical evidence drawn from interviews with 129 current and former residents on issues such as how and why they enlisted in Al-Shabaab in the first place, how and why they disengaged, and their experiences of reintegration post-exit. While closely related prison-based initiatives have become increasingly common over recent years in countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Yemen, Serendi-style semi-open residential rehabilitation centres for ‘low-risk’ former violent extremists remain comparatively rare. The authors of this report advocate for cautiously upscaling such efforts in Somalia, as well as exploring the possibilities to replicate this form of programming in other comparable environments.
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190104_whr_4-18_deradicalisation_and_disengagement_in_somalia_web.pdf
THE SERENDI REHABILITATION centre in Mogadishu offers support to ‘low-risk’ former members of Al-Shabaab to prepare them for reintegration into the community, as part of the wider strategy of the Federal Government of Somalia and its international partners to counter the organisation. While certain challenges remain, between 2015 and 2018 Serendi was gradually converted into a functional centre in terms of its conditions and services offered. As such,
the implementing team has now additionally been tasked with supporting both outreach (messaging campaigns to encourage additional disengagements from Al-Shabaab, as well as other related activities) and community reintegration of beneficiaries after leaving the centre.
This report presents detailed information about the Serendi programme, as well as wider empirical evidence drawn from interviews with 129 current and former residents on issues such as how and why they enlisted in Al-Shabaab in the first place, how and why they disengaged, and their experiences of reintegration post-exit. While closely related prison-based initiatives have become increasingly common over recent years in countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Yemen, Serendi-style semi-open residential rehabilitation centres for ‘low-risk’ former violent extremists remain comparatively rare. The authors of this report advocate for cautiously upscaling such efforts in Somalia, as well as exploring the possibilities to replicate this form of programming in other comparable environments.
How Do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings? The Case of Al-Shabaab
Mohammed Ibrahim Shire
Received 11 Mar 2020, Accepted 23 May 2020, Published online: 17 Jun 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021
ABSTRACT: Targeted killing is a cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy, and tactical mistakes made by militant groups are endemic in terrorism. Yet, how do they affect a militant group’s suicide bomber deployment? Since joining Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has carried out various types of suicide attacks on different targets. Using a uniquely constructed dataset, I introduce two typologies of suicide bomber detonation profiles – single and multiple – and explore the strategic purposes these have served for the group during multiphasic stages following targeted killings against the group’s leadership and targeting errors committed by Al-Shabaab. The findings reveal that targeted killing has the opposite effect of disrupting suicide attacks, instead, leading to a rapid proliferation of unsophisticated single suicide attacks against civilian and military targets to maintain the perception of the group’s potency. Thus, I argue that targeting errors made by Al-Shabaab have a more serious detrimental effect on its deployment of suicide attacks than any counter-terrorism measure.
Mohammed Ibrahim Shire
Received 11 Mar 2020, Accepted 23 May 2020, Published online: 17 Jun 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021
ABSTRACT: Targeted killing is a cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy, and tactical mistakes made by militant groups are endemic in terrorism. Yet, how do they affect a militant group’s suicide bomber deployment? Since joining Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has carried out various types of suicide attacks on different targets. Using a uniquely constructed dataset, I introduce two typologies of suicide bomber detonation profiles – single and multiple – and explore the strategic purposes these have served for the group during multiphasic stages following targeted killings against the group’s leadership and targeting errors committed by Al-Shabaab. The findings reveal that targeted killing has the opposite effect of disrupting suicide attacks, instead, leading to a rapid proliferation of unsophisticated single suicide attacks against civilian and military targets to maintain the perception of the group’s potency. Thus, I argue that targeting errors made by Al-Shabaab have a more serious detrimental effect on its deployment of suicide attacks than any counter-terrorism measure.
The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab
Orly Maya Stern
http://www.orlystern.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Invisible-Women-of-al-Shabaab-.pdf
The study of militant groups tends to be male-focussed, centring on male recruits, male participation and men’s passage in and out of fighting groups. Men are viewed in isolation, detached from their families and communities. In this vein, the study of al-Shabaab has centred primarily on its men – as have the interventions aimed at dealing with al-Shabaab; preventing recruitment from the group and encouraging defection. This focus obscures an important, yet often concealed part of the picture; The women associated with al-Shabaab. The solitary focus on men fails to capture the part that women play in supporting al-Shabaab – those of the women who actively serve the group; the roles and influences of militant’s wives; the experiences of women forced into the group, and the parts that women play in encouraging men to defect. These understandings can provide valuable insights into how to better contest and degrade the group.
Married in the Shadows: The Wives of al-Shabaab
Orly Maya Stern
http://www.orlystern.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Wives-of-al-Shabaab-final.pdf
Waging a successful insurgency, requires an enabling community. Militants tend to have wives and families who support and facilitate them. Fighters and their families form a complex web – an interconnected system that needs to be understood, to truly comprehend the workings of an armed group. A key – yet under-studied – part of this picture, are the wives of militants. This report looks at the wives of al-Shabaab’s militants; members of the Somali Islamist group embroiled in a conflict with Somalia’s government and people; the group responsible for one of the deadliest insurgencies in Africa.
Orly Maya Stern
http://www.orlystern.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Invisible-Women-of-al-Shabaab-.pdf
The study of militant groups tends to be male-focussed, centring on male recruits, male participation and men’s passage in and out of fighting groups. Men are viewed in isolation, detached from their families and communities. In this vein, the study of al-Shabaab has centred primarily on its men – as have the interventions aimed at dealing with al-Shabaab; preventing recruitment from the group and encouraging defection. This focus obscures an important, yet often concealed part of the picture; The women associated with al-Shabaab. The solitary focus on men fails to capture the part that women play in supporting al-Shabaab – those of the women who actively serve the group; the roles and influences of militant’s wives; the experiences of women forced into the group, and the parts that women play in encouraging men to defect. These understandings can provide valuable insights into how to better contest and degrade the group.
Married in the Shadows: The Wives of al-Shabaab
Orly Maya Stern
http://www.orlystern.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Wives-of-al-Shabaab-final.pdf
Waging a successful insurgency, requires an enabling community. Militants tend to have wives and families who support and facilitate them. Fighters and their families form a complex web – an interconnected system that needs to be understood, to truly comprehend the workings of an armed group. A key – yet under-studied – part of this picture, are the wives of militants. This report looks at the wives of al-Shabaab’s militants; members of the Somali Islamist group embroiled in a conflict with Somalia’s government and people; the group responsible for one of the deadliest insurgencies in Africa.
Somalia Specific Scholarship
Not All Plain Sailing: The Highs and Lows of Iran’s Scramble for the Horn of Africa
Tiziana Corda
Published: 14 Sept 2021
This chapter traces the evolution and significance of the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Horn of Africa. Compared to other areas of Iran’s neighbourhood, Tehran’s power projection in this African subregion has largely remained under-researched. Yet, lately, foreign powers’ renewed interest in the Horn following the latter’s growing geostrategic relevance has contributed to reviving the academic debate related to it. By adopting a complex realist theoretical framework, the aim of this chapter is to explore the reasons why the Horn of Africa is a very coveted spot for many foreign powers, including Iran; which objectives have driven Tehran’s policies in that area; and how its élites have tried to pursue them over the past decades. To do so, after a brief overview of the Horn’s inherent value, the chapter first presents the core dimensions of the strategy Iran has devised to meet its interests there. Then, it moves onto the empirical research proper, consisting in a chronological, in-depth analysis of Iran’s actions in the Horn region, across the four main dimensions which constitute its Horn strategy: political support, military interactions, economic relations, and, to a lesser degree than in other African regions, ideological and soft power penetration. The empirical analysis reveals the complex web of global, regional, and domestic factors behind Iran’s Horn policies and the impossibility to separate the dynamics of Iran’s reach towards the Horn from those of its regional and extra-regional competitors
Tiziana Corda
Published: 14 Sept 2021
This chapter traces the evolution and significance of the presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Horn of Africa. Compared to other areas of Iran’s neighbourhood, Tehran’s power projection in this African subregion has largely remained under-researched. Yet, lately, foreign powers’ renewed interest in the Horn following the latter’s growing geostrategic relevance has contributed to reviving the academic debate related to it. By adopting a complex realist theoretical framework, the aim of this chapter is to explore the reasons why the Horn of Africa is a very coveted spot for many foreign powers, including Iran; which objectives have driven Tehran’s policies in that area; and how its élites have tried to pursue them over the past decades. To do so, after a brief overview of the Horn’s inherent value, the chapter first presents the core dimensions of the strategy Iran has devised to meet its interests there. Then, it moves onto the empirical research proper, consisting in a chronological, in-depth analysis of Iran’s actions in the Horn region, across the four main dimensions which constitute its Horn strategy: political support, military interactions, economic relations, and, to a lesser degree than in other African regions, ideological and soft power penetration. The empirical analysis reveals the complex web of global, regional, and domestic factors behind Iran’s Horn policies and the impossibility to separate the dynamics of Iran’s reach towards the Horn from those of its regional and extra-regional competitors
THE LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism: Somalia Case Study
Vanda Felbab-Brown
May 2018
This report proceeds as follows: The Context Section discusses the Somali military, political context, developments in recent years, the quality of governance by formal state institutions and al Shabaab, and societal attitudes toward those associated with the group. The next section reviews the design and programmatic content of current approaches to leniency, amnesty, and accountability – of government-led processes, traditional justice mechanisms, and informal reconciliation processes led by Somali NGOs. It describes the existing policy framework, the lack of an adequate legal framework, and the role of the amnesty and defectors program in the government’s overall strategy toward al Shabaab. It then details the leniency policies toward high-value, high-risk, and low-risk defectors and evaluates their accomplishments and challenges, such as regarding women. Finally, the section details and assesses traditional justice and clan reconciliation mechanisms, such as xeer, as well as Somali NGO-led reconciliation processes. The following section provides an overall assessment of current approaches in Somalia to amnesty, defectors programs, and high-value defector co-optation deals. It highlights, inter alia: the lack of transparency and consistency regarding the reception of defectors and the high-value co-optation deals, as well as screening challenges; the lack of legal certainty for defectors; and reintegration challenges. The section also emphasises the need to integrate into programmatic treatment for low-risk defectors the motivations of those who join al Shabaab or become associated with it, while recognising the role of grievances, exclusion, social and economic marginalisation, and corruption. It also raises the issue of foreign fighters among al Shabaab, a topic currently off the radar screen of existing government processes. The report concludes by offering a detailed set of policy recommendations.
Vanda Felbab-Brown
May 2018
This report proceeds as follows: The Context Section discusses the Somali military, political context, developments in recent years, the quality of governance by formal state institutions and al Shabaab, and societal attitudes toward those associated with the group. The next section reviews the design and programmatic content of current approaches to leniency, amnesty, and accountability – of government-led processes, traditional justice mechanisms, and informal reconciliation processes led by Somali NGOs. It describes the existing policy framework, the lack of an adequate legal framework, and the role of the amnesty and defectors program in the government’s overall strategy toward al Shabaab. It then details the leniency policies toward high-value, high-risk, and low-risk defectors and evaluates their accomplishments and challenges, such as regarding women. Finally, the section details and assesses traditional justice and clan reconciliation mechanisms, such as xeer, as well as Somali NGO-led reconciliation processes. The following section provides an overall assessment of current approaches in Somalia to amnesty, defectors programs, and high-value defector co-optation deals. It highlights, inter alia: the lack of transparency and consistency regarding the reception of defectors and the high-value co-optation deals, as well as screening challenges; the lack of legal certainty for defectors; and reintegration challenges. The section also emphasises the need to integrate into programmatic treatment for low-risk defectors the motivations of those who join al Shabaab or become associated with it, while recognising the role of grievances, exclusion, social and economic marginalisation, and corruption. It also raises the issue of foreign fighters among al Shabaab, a topic currently off the radar screen of existing government processes. The report concludes by offering a detailed set of policy recommendations.
Militant Islamism and local clan dynamics in Somalia: the expansion of the Islamic Courts Union in Lower Jubba province
Michael Skjelderup,Mukhtar Ainashe &Ahmed Mohamed Abdulle “Qare”
Pages 553-571 | Received 05 Oct 2018, Accepted 26 Jun 2020, Published online: 09 Jul 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789929
Over the course of only a few months in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated the clan-based faction leaders in Mogadishu and conquered most parts of South-Central Somalia, an achievement unprecedented since the fall of the Somali state in 1991. The ICU’s rapid expansion met with little resistance and the local populations generally received their forces with enthusiasm. Drawing on unique empirical material, the paper discusses why and how the ICU alliance expanded in Somalia’s southernmost province Lower Jubba. While ICU’s initial success in Mogadishu was due to a combination of several factors, discussed in existing literature, this paper contents that its wider expansion in Lower Jubba was largely caused by ICU’s ability to utilize local dynamics, structured along clan lines. While the ICU was initially welcomed by the local population in Lower Jubba, its Islamist inspired politics was soon heavily challenged throughout the province.
Michael Skjelderup,Mukhtar Ainashe &Ahmed Mohamed Abdulle “Qare”
Pages 553-571 | Received 05 Oct 2018, Accepted 26 Jun 2020, Published online: 09 Jul 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789929
Over the course of only a few months in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated the clan-based faction leaders in Mogadishu and conquered most parts of South-Central Somalia, an achievement unprecedented since the fall of the Somali state in 1991. The ICU’s rapid expansion met with little resistance and the local populations generally received their forces with enthusiasm. Drawing on unique empirical material, the paper discusses why and how the ICU alliance expanded in Somalia’s southernmost province Lower Jubba. While ICU’s initial success in Mogadishu was due to a combination of several factors, discussed in existing literature, this paper contents that its wider expansion in Lower Jubba was largely caused by ICU’s ability to utilize local dynamics, structured along clan lines. While the ICU was initially welcomed by the local population in Lower Jubba, its Islamist inspired politics was soon heavily challenged throughout the province.
They are from within us: CVE brokerage in South-central Somalia
Linnéa Gelot &Stig Jarle Hansen
Pages 563-582 | Published online: 05 Dec 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688961
This article explores how societal actors in Somalia take part in a transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarisation. We argue that the transnational politics of CVE represents an extension of global militarism by some states, institutions, donors and brokers. CVE works to adapt global militarism and to reconfigure the global-local relationships that sustain it. We explore the roles and influence of local ‘CVE brokers’ in deradicalisation efforts in South-central Somalia. They inadvertently merge the counter-terrorism approach to Somali people, values and territory with non-military means. We show that their key practices – co-ordination, translation and alignment – advance, but also disrupt, alter and transform CVE policy objectives.
KEYWORDS: Global militarism, violent extremism, deradicalisation, Somalia, al-Shabaab
Linnéa Gelot &Stig Jarle Hansen
Pages 563-582 | Published online: 05 Dec 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688961
This article explores how societal actors in Somalia take part in a transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarisation. We argue that the transnational politics of CVE represents an extension of global militarism by some states, institutions, donors and brokers. CVE works to adapt global militarism and to reconfigure the global-local relationships that sustain it. We explore the roles and influence of local ‘CVE brokers’ in deradicalisation efforts in South-central Somalia. They inadvertently merge the counter-terrorism approach to Somali people, values and territory with non-military means. We show that their key practices – co-ordination, translation and alignment – advance, but also disrupt, alter and transform CVE policy objectives.
KEYWORDS: Global militarism, violent extremism, deradicalisation, Somalia, al-Shabaab
Nuclear security and Somalia
Eric Herring,Latif Ismail,Tom B. Scott &Jaap Velthuis
Pages 1-16 | Received 02 Oct 2019, Accepted 08 Feb 2020, Published online: 21 Feb 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23779497.2020.1729220
ABSTRACT: Scholars have not regarded Somalia as a place of relevance to thinking about nuclear security. This article gives four reasons why this perspective is not well founded. First, as the state strengthens it needs an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security regime for the control of nuclear materials. Second, it has unsecured uranium reserves that could be smuggled abroad. Third, those unsecured uranium reserves could be accessed by terrorists for use in a ‘dirty’ bomb. Fourth, there is evidence of past ‘ecomafia’ intent and planning, and possible success, in dumping radioactive waste on land in Somalia or in its territorial waters. The article proposes an innovative system of uranium ore fingerprinting, covert sensors, mobile phone reporting and surveying and evaluation capabilities that would address all four issues. The proposed system would include a low-cost method for turning any smart phone into a radiation detector to crowdsource reporting of possible nuclear materials, plus aerial and underwater drones with low cost radiation sensors.
Eric Herring,Latif Ismail,Tom B. Scott &Jaap Velthuis
Pages 1-16 | Received 02 Oct 2019, Accepted 08 Feb 2020, Published online: 21 Feb 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23779497.2020.1729220
ABSTRACT: Scholars have not regarded Somalia as a place of relevance to thinking about nuclear security. This article gives four reasons why this perspective is not well founded. First, as the state strengthens it needs an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security regime for the control of nuclear materials. Second, it has unsecured uranium reserves that could be smuggled abroad. Third, those unsecured uranium reserves could be accessed by terrorists for use in a ‘dirty’ bomb. Fourth, there is evidence of past ‘ecomafia’ intent and planning, and possible success, in dumping radioactive waste on land in Somalia or in its territorial waters. The article proposes an innovative system of uranium ore fingerprinting, covert sensors, mobile phone reporting and surveying and evaluation capabilities that would address all four issues. The proposed system would include a low-cost method for turning any smart phone into a radiation detector to crowdsource reporting of possible nuclear materials, plus aerial and underwater drones with low cost radiation sensors.
Police empowerment and police militarisation in times of protracted conflict: Examining public perceptions in southern Somalia
Daisy Muibu
Published online: 11 May 2021
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.1924255?journalCode=rsaj20
ABSTRACT: Residents of Kismayo, Somalia choose to empower local police with greater discretionary authority. Why is this so? Can police militarisation encourage such public views? Relying on a new dataset on community perceptions and qualitative field interviews, this study examines the relationship between perceived police militarisation and police empowerment in a society that has experienced prolonged conflict and currently faces an active insurgent threat. Despite the poor record of police militarisation in western democracies, this study's quantitative findings suggest that the more visible dimensions of police militarisation (material and cultural) are significantly related to greater public support for police empowerment in southern Somalia. Specifically, field interviews reveal that the symbolic appearance of militarisation and the accompanying hierarchical discipline and formalism convey a level of preparedness and professionalism that encourages residents to willingly empower police. Furthermore, results also suggest that clan representation within the force is significantly associated with police empowerment.
Daisy Muibu
Published online: 11 May 2021
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2021.1924255?journalCode=rsaj20
ABSTRACT: Residents of Kismayo, Somalia choose to empower local police with greater discretionary authority. Why is this so? Can police militarisation encourage such public views? Relying on a new dataset on community perceptions and qualitative field interviews, this study examines the relationship between perceived police militarisation and police empowerment in a society that has experienced prolonged conflict and currently faces an active insurgent threat. Despite the poor record of police militarisation in western democracies, this study's quantitative findings suggest that the more visible dimensions of police militarisation (material and cultural) are significantly related to greater public support for police empowerment in southern Somalia. Specifically, field interviews reveal that the symbolic appearance of militarisation and the accompanying hierarchical discipline and formalism convey a level of preparedness and professionalism that encourages residents to willingly empower police. Furthermore, results also suggest that clan representation within the force is significantly associated with police empowerment.
Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018
Paul D. Williams
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210
Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.
Additional works by Paul Williams:
Paul D. Williams
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210
Over a decade of security force assistance (SFA) initiatives to build an effective Somali National Army (SNA) failed because of the interrelated effects of political, contextual and operational challenges. The key political challenges were interest asymmetry between international actors and Somali elites, insufficient focus on institution-building and a lack of donor coordination. The principal contextual challenges in Somalia were the legacies of two decades of state collapse and the negative effects of clan dynamics. The main operational challenges were building an army while simultaneously fighting a war, the complexities of military integration, and the severe capability gaps afflicting the SNA.
Additional works by Paul Williams:
- JULY 2020 Understanding US Policy in Somalia: Current Challenges and Future Options This paper summarizes the US mission in Somalia, analyses how it is being implemented, and assesses whether US policy in Somalia is working. It also outlines three scenarios for future US engagement. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/understanding-us-policy-somalia-current-challenges-and-future-options
- OCT 2019: A report for the International Peace Institute that tries to distill the main policy and operational lessons that have emerged from AMISOM's experiences in Somalia: https://www.ipinst.org/2019/10/lessons-partnership-peacekeeping-amisom
- OCT 2019: A coauthored article about the challenges of urban peace operations, examining AMISOM's first 3 years in Mogadishu: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23802014.2019.1678399
Rebuilding armies in southern Somalia: What currently should donors realistically aim for?
Colin D. Robinson
Published online: 16 Jun 2021
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2021.1940773?journalCode=ccsd20
ABSTRACT: Improving defence accountability and effectiveness is even more difficult when wars are actively underway. Southern Somalia bears considerable resemblance to previous counterinsurgency theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus considerations of defence assistance should be actively informed by those campaigns. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) intervention force has been critical to seizing much of the towns and terrain now freed from the Islamist Al-Shabaab insurgents. But after 13 years AMISOM’s power is waning. There are vanishingly few instant and game-changing initiatives donors could take quickly to aid the build-up of Somali military forces either at the federal or regional levels. Yet decentralised Federal Member State governments represent important political forces in southern Somalia, and since 2012 efforts have been made to reinforce them. Perhaps the most immediate action that donors could take to aid the build-up of legitimate Somali military forces is to supply and work with, not just the Federal Government’s forces as has long been the case, but also the various military forces maintained by the Federal Member States.
Glimpse into an army at its peak: notes on the Somali National Army in the 1960–80s
Colin D. Robinson
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2019.1675944
ABSTRACT: Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham correctly argue that the structures, characteristics, and operating methods of official security institutions in Africa have been somewhat neglected, with a lack of much recent research. The Somali National Army (SNA) sits among these lacunae. Its formal structures can be used as a skeletal starting point and springboard to start to draw the network diagrams that chart informal linkages. This is why recent declassification decisions by U.S. intelligence bodies, coupled with period documents released to the UK National Archives, hold significance in helping us understand early hierarchical SNA arrangements. They show the steady build-up in size of the force, to 1987, to about the time the civil war began to fragment the state.
The Somali National Army: an assessment
Colin D. Robinson, April 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600805
ABSTRACT: To engage properly with the Somali National Army, to understand it in the hope of improving stability and the lives of over 12 million Somalis, good basic information on its composition and characteristics is necessary. Authoritative accounts on the subject have been scarce for over 25 years. This account seeks to detail the army’s dispositions across southern Somalia, and, more importantly, the brigades’ clan compositions and linkages. Clan ties supersede loyalties to the central government. The army as it stands is a collection of former militias which suffer from ill-discipline and commit crime along with greater atrocities. Estimates of numbers are unreliable, but there might be 13,000 or more fighters in six brigades in the Mogadishu area and five beyond.
Colin D. Robinson
Published online: 16 Jun 2021
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2021.1940773?journalCode=ccsd20
ABSTRACT: Improving defence accountability and effectiveness is even more difficult when wars are actively underway. Southern Somalia bears considerable resemblance to previous counterinsurgency theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus considerations of defence assistance should be actively informed by those campaigns. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) intervention force has been critical to seizing much of the towns and terrain now freed from the Islamist Al-Shabaab insurgents. But after 13 years AMISOM’s power is waning. There are vanishingly few instant and game-changing initiatives donors could take quickly to aid the build-up of Somali military forces either at the federal or regional levels. Yet decentralised Federal Member State governments represent important political forces in southern Somalia, and since 2012 efforts have been made to reinforce them. Perhaps the most immediate action that donors could take to aid the build-up of legitimate Somali military forces is to supply and work with, not just the Federal Government’s forces as has long been the case, but also the various military forces maintained by the Federal Member States.
Glimpse into an army at its peak: notes on the Somali National Army in the 1960–80s
Colin D. Robinson
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2019.1675944
ABSTRACT: Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham correctly argue that the structures, characteristics, and operating methods of official security institutions in Africa have been somewhat neglected, with a lack of much recent research. The Somali National Army (SNA) sits among these lacunae. Its formal structures can be used as a skeletal starting point and springboard to start to draw the network diagrams that chart informal linkages. This is why recent declassification decisions by U.S. intelligence bodies, coupled with period documents released to the UK National Archives, hold significance in helping us understand early hierarchical SNA arrangements. They show the steady build-up in size of the force, to 1987, to about the time the civil war began to fragment the state.
The Somali National Army: an assessment
Colin D. Robinson, April 2019
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600805
ABSTRACT: To engage properly with the Somali National Army, to understand it in the hope of improving stability and the lives of over 12 million Somalis, good basic information on its composition and characteristics is necessary. Authoritative accounts on the subject have been scarce for over 25 years. This account seeks to detail the army’s dispositions across southern Somalia, and, more importantly, the brigades’ clan compositions and linkages. Clan ties supersede loyalties to the central government. The army as it stands is a collection of former militias which suffer from ill-discipline and commit crime along with greater atrocities. Estimates of numbers are unreliable, but there might be 13,000 or more fighters in six brigades in the Mogadishu area and five beyond.
Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, July 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2020.1740752
ABSTRACT: This article examines the various deficiencies of the security agency of the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu in terms of intelligence capacity, capability and competence to counter Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahiduun (hereafter Al-Shabaab), the militant movement fighting against the government and its external backers. Based on field-based oral and written research data in Mogadishu, the article argues that the heavy dependence of the government's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) on various external patrons essentially makes the agency less efficient and effective than Al-Shabaab's intelligence agency, the Amniyat. Looking at the internal dynamics of the government and its rival insurgency movement offers fresh anthropological insights into how the Amniyat is more dynamic than the government's intelligence agency. In spite of its internal faults and failures, the Federal Government has become stuck in an externally-imposed security architecture envisioned by the so-called ‘partners’. This has made the NISA far behind the Amniyat in terms of security provision because both opposing security agencies pursue different methods to broadcast their power and presence. Delving deeper into the inner workings of the security institutions of the NISA and the Amniyat demonstrates that the performances and practices of the two intelligence agencies reflect the acute failure that inherently characterises the government security sector.
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, July 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2020.1740752
ABSTRACT: This article examines the various deficiencies of the security agency of the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu in terms of intelligence capacity, capability and competence to counter Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahiduun (hereafter Al-Shabaab), the militant movement fighting against the government and its external backers. Based on field-based oral and written research data in Mogadishu, the article argues that the heavy dependence of the government's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) on various external patrons essentially makes the agency less efficient and effective than Al-Shabaab's intelligence agency, the Amniyat. Looking at the internal dynamics of the government and its rival insurgency movement offers fresh anthropological insights into how the Amniyat is more dynamic than the government's intelligence agency. In spite of its internal faults and failures, the Federal Government has become stuck in an externally-imposed security architecture envisioned by the so-called ‘partners’. This has made the NISA far behind the Amniyat in terms of security provision because both opposing security agencies pursue different methods to broadcast their power and presence. Delving deeper into the inner workings of the security institutions of the NISA and the Amniyat demonstrates that the performances and practices of the two intelligence agencies reflect the acute failure that inherently characterises the government security sector.
Relevant Scholarship
Doing Good while Killing: Why Some Insurgent Groups Provide Community Services
Victor Asal,Shawn Flanigan &Ora Szekely
Published online: 15 May 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/JTUDZMGXPS7G7Z9KMDTJ/full?target=10.1080/09546553.2020.1745775
ABSTRACT: Many nonstate military organizations provide a wide range of social services to civilians. The apparent contradiction between their use of violence and their provision of charity has been the subject of a great deal of research in the conflict studies literature. Two of the most common sets of arguments hold that such services are either a form of bribery aimed at controlling and isolating constituents and potential recruits, or an extension of the organization’s ideological commitments. Our findings, based on a new analysis of the BAAD dataset, demonstrate that neither explanation is correct. Rather, we find that the provision of social services represents a means of confronting and undermining the authority of the state. In this sense, the provision of social services represents an extension of the broader political goals of the nonstate armed groups providing them.
Victor Asal,Shawn Flanigan &Ora Szekely
Published online: 15 May 2020
https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/JTUDZMGXPS7G7Z9KMDTJ/full?target=10.1080/09546553.2020.1745775
ABSTRACT: Many nonstate military organizations provide a wide range of social services to civilians. The apparent contradiction between their use of violence and their provision of charity has been the subject of a great deal of research in the conflict studies literature. Two of the most common sets of arguments hold that such services are either a form of bribery aimed at controlling and isolating constituents and potential recruits, or an extension of the organization’s ideological commitments. Our findings, based on a new analysis of the BAAD dataset, demonstrate that neither explanation is correct. Rather, we find that the provision of social services represents a means of confronting and undermining the authority of the state. In this sense, the provision of social services represents an extension of the broader political goals of the nonstate armed groups providing them.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit policy research and analysis institute based in Mogadishu, Somalia.
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Youth Unemployment and Security In Somalia: Prioritizing Jobs For Achieving Stability
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
Based on survey in seven major cities in Somalia, this report explains the dynamics, depth, scope, and salience of youth unemployment in the country. It further discusses the vulnerability of unemployed youth to recruitment by violent groups as well as extremism, clan violence, armed political militancy, and armed robbery. Finally, the research explores the prospects for employment programs that can help prevent youth
from participating in violent conflicts.
Structural Impediments To Reviving Somalia’s Security Forces April 2021
For over a decade, successive Somali governments and the international community have been earnestly trying to revive Somalia’s security forces (SSF) as part of a broader effort to stabilize the country following the collapse of the state in 1991. Billions of dollars were spent on training and equipping tens of thousands of military, police, and intelligence personnel so that they could stabilize their country and liberate from the grip of the militant group al-Shabaab and enforce the rule of law. Nearly 15 years later, neither of the two objectives is fully realized, and the country’s security forces remain perpetually weak, deeply fractured, and increasingly politicized.
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
Based on survey in seven major cities in Somalia, this report explains the dynamics, depth, scope, and salience of youth unemployment in the country. It further discusses the vulnerability of unemployed youth to recruitment by violent groups as well as extremism, clan violence, armed political militancy, and armed robbery. Finally, the research explores the prospects for employment programs that can help prevent youth
from participating in violent conflicts.
Structural Impediments To Reviving Somalia’s Security Forces April 2021
For over a decade, successive Somali governments and the international community have been earnestly trying to revive Somalia’s security forces (SSF) as part of a broader effort to stabilize the country following the collapse of the state in 1991. Billions of dollars were spent on training and equipping tens of thousands of military, police, and intelligence personnel so that they could stabilize their country and liberate from the grip of the militant group al-Shabaab and enforce the rule of law. Nearly 15 years later, neither of the two objectives is fully realized, and the country’s security forces remain perpetually weak, deeply fractured, and increasingly politicized.
Hiraal Institute’s vision is to be the premier security research and analysis organisation that develops solutions to Horn of Africa’s security challenges to help make the region and the world more secure
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Losing Game: Countering Al-Shabab’s Financial System - 2020
Much has changed since Hiraal Institute’s 2018 report on the AS financial system. The group’s capability in tax collection has improved, and complaints about the group’s reach have been growing ever since. This study was therefore done in order to understand how the group has been faring since then, what the government’s reactions have accomplished, and what can be done in order to curb the group’s financial operations.
The Al-Shabab Finance System - July 2018
This paper discusses Al-Shabab’s (AS) financial system and estimates the amount collected by the group, based on figures provided to Hiraal by former AS finance and Zakawaat officials. With the rise of Islamic State in Somalia, AS is not the only terrorist group currently involved in tax collection in Somalia;
however, it is currently the largest, and this paper therefore focuses on the group.
Al-Shabab's Military Machine - December 2018
In its early years, AS relied on recruits from Mogadishu and other urban areas. As it has lost major population centres in the past seven years, most of its new recruits come from the rural areas, specifically the Bay and Bakol regions. This is because those regions are heavily populated, and the group still controls rural areas where most of the population live in the two regions. Most new recruits are children who have gone through the AS education system, which greatly increases their loyalty to the group. This AS investment in the future will greatly increase the chances of its struggle to continue for at least another generation. Nevertheless, recruitment was negatively affected by the aerial bombing of an AS training camp in Hiran in 2015; this means that renewed bombing of training camps this year will further hurt recruitment.
Much has changed since Hiraal Institute’s 2018 report on the AS financial system. The group’s capability in tax collection has improved, and complaints about the group’s reach have been growing ever since. This study was therefore done in order to understand how the group has been faring since then, what the government’s reactions have accomplished, and what can be done in order to curb the group’s financial operations.
The Al-Shabab Finance System - July 2018
This paper discusses Al-Shabab’s (AS) financial system and estimates the amount collected by the group, based on figures provided to Hiraal by former AS finance and Zakawaat officials. With the rise of Islamic State in Somalia, AS is not the only terrorist group currently involved in tax collection in Somalia;
however, it is currently the largest, and this paper therefore focuses on the group.
Al-Shabab's Military Machine - December 2018
In its early years, AS relied on recruits from Mogadishu and other urban areas. As it has lost major population centres in the past seven years, most of its new recruits come from the rural areas, specifically the Bay and Bakol regions. This is because those regions are heavily populated, and the group still controls rural areas where most of the population live in the two regions. Most new recruits are children who have gone through the AS education system, which greatly increases their loyalty to the group. This AS investment in the future will greatly increase the chances of its struggle to continue for at least another generation. Nevertheless, recruitment was negatively affected by the aerial bombing of an AS training camp in Hiran in 2015; this means that renewed bombing of training camps this year will further hurt recruitment.
The Global Initiative comprises a network of over 500 independent global and regional experts working on human rights, democracy, governance, and development issues where organized crime has become increasingly pertinent.
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The price of civil war: A survey of Somalia's arms markets
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Key findings
A triangle of vulnerability: Changing patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast
https://globalinitiative.net/triangle-vulnerability-swahili-coast/
A triangle of vulnerability for illicit trafficking is emerging as a key geographic space along Africa’s eastern seaboard – the Swahili coast. At one apex of this triangle is Zanzibar, a major hub for illicit trade for decades, but one that is currently assuming greater importance. Further south, another apex is northern Mozambique. This area is experiencing significant conflict and instability, and is increasingly a key through route for the illicit trafficking of heroin into the continent and wildlife products from the interior. The final apex of the triangle is out to sea: the Comoros islands, lying 290 kilometres offshore from northern Mozambique and north-east of Madagascar. Comoros is not yet a major trafficking hub, but perennial political instability and its connections into the wider sub-regional trafficking economy make it uniquely vulnerable as illicit trade continues to evolve along the wider Swahili coastal region. These three apexes are linked by illicit economies and trade routes which take little heed of modern political boundaries.
Following the money: The use of the hawala remittance system in the Yemen–Somalia arms trade
https://globalinitiative.net/yemen-somalia-arms/
The ubiquity of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Yemen, as well as centuries-old cultural and commercial ties with Somalia, has made Yemen the primary source for illicit arms among Somali importers. Consignments of small arms and ammunition from Yemen cross the Gulf of Aden in a matter of hours to the northern coast of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia. The port city of Bosaso, Puntland’s largest city and commercial capital, is the financial epicentre of the illicit trade. Arms from Yemen fuel the ongoing civil conflict in Somalia, and many are believed to be transported on throughout the broader East Africa region.
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Key findings
- More than 60 per cent of the illicit weapons found in Somalia had been manufactured in China.
- Almost 95 per cent of the illicit weapons found in Somalia were assault or battle rifles.
- Weapon-pricing trends support the notion that illicit flows originate in northern Somalia and extend southward.
- Chinese- and Russian-manufactured assault rifles were priced almost identically in illicit markets, despite Russian rifles typically being decades older.
- KLS and KLF assault rifles likely to be of Iranian manufacture – possibly part of illicit arms transfers from Iran to Yemen – were also documented by our researchers.
- NATO-calibre G3 battle rifles and corresponding ammunition – some of which is of Saudi Arabian manufacture – are increasingly common in northern Somalia.
- Weapons from Somali federal government stocks continue to leak into the illicit market.
- More than 20 weapons bearing similarly falsified serial numbers were found in southern Somalia – apparently Type 56 Chinese assault rifles, modified to appear Russian.
- Arms diverted into Puntland from Iranian and Saudi Arabian transfers to their respective allies embroiled in the Yemen conflict could have particularly destabilizing consequences in the region.
- The deteriorating security situation in northern Somalia may also allow space for arms-trafficking networks to operate with greater ease.
- In future, arms trafficking networks in Somalia may well spread further into the Horn of Africa.
A triangle of vulnerability: Changing patterns of illicit trafficking off the Swahili coast
https://globalinitiative.net/triangle-vulnerability-swahili-coast/
A triangle of vulnerability for illicit trafficking is emerging as a key geographic space along Africa’s eastern seaboard – the Swahili coast. At one apex of this triangle is Zanzibar, a major hub for illicit trade for decades, but one that is currently assuming greater importance. Further south, another apex is northern Mozambique. This area is experiencing significant conflict and instability, and is increasingly a key through route for the illicit trafficking of heroin into the continent and wildlife products from the interior. The final apex of the triangle is out to sea: the Comoros islands, lying 290 kilometres offshore from northern Mozambique and north-east of Madagascar. Comoros is not yet a major trafficking hub, but perennial political instability and its connections into the wider sub-regional trafficking economy make it uniquely vulnerable as illicit trade continues to evolve along the wider Swahili coastal region. These three apexes are linked by illicit economies and trade routes which take little heed of modern political boundaries.
Following the money: The use of the hawala remittance system in the Yemen–Somalia arms trade
https://globalinitiative.net/yemen-somalia-arms/
The ubiquity of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Yemen, as well as centuries-old cultural and commercial ties with Somalia, has made Yemen the primary source for illicit arms among Somali importers. Consignments of small arms and ammunition from Yemen cross the Gulf of Aden in a matter of hours to the northern coast of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northern Somalia. The port city of Bosaso, Puntland’s largest city and commercial capital, is the financial epicentre of the illicit trade. Arms from Yemen fuel the ongoing civil conflict in Somalia, and many are believed to be transported on throughout the broader East Africa region.
Government/IO/NGO Reports
United Nations Security Council Reports
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/ The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: An Assessment, November 2020 https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-background-papers/european-union-training-mission-somalia-assessment Human Rights Watch 2020 Report https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia U.S. Department of State, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/somalia/ 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Somalia U.S. Department of State, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/somalia/ Climate-related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia, October 2019 https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-policy-papers/climate-related-security-risks-and-peacebuilding-somalia Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2018/1149) This report covers major developments in Somalia from 23 August to 13 December 2018. It provides information about the activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).
Public Media Why the U.S. Military is in Somalia November 2017 The U.S. response to the challenges in Somalia has been to work with the Federal Government and the Federal Member state administrations, in coordination with the African Union, the United Nations, and other partners working toward a common goal: to support Somali-led efforts to stabilize and rebuild their country along democratic and federal lines. Militant Islamist Group Activity in the Sahel Rises October 2018 Expansion of violent events linked to an array of militant Islamist groups in the Sahel highlights the growing scope of security challenges facing this region. (Note: Somalia is not in the Sahel, but this map does cover some activity in HOA [Horn of Africa]) Al Shabaab's Mata Hari Network August 2018 |
Briefings
Taking Stock of Somalia’s Security Landscape (~95 mins) October 2018
During the tenure of President Mohammed Farmajo, Somalia has developed a comprehensive transition plan for its security, undertaken reforms of the Somali National Army, and strengthened ties with regional and international security partners. This has been accompanied by a decline in Al Shabaab violence against citizens and the reopening of the Mogadishu Stadium to sporting events. Nonetheless, Al Shabaab remains resilient, regularly mounting attacks on security forces and populated areas alike while maintaining control over large expanses of rural Somalia.
The Future of AMISOM (~90 mins) October 2018 A panel discussion addressing the evolution, challenges, and future of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Deployed in 2007 to counter the threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia, AMISOM remains the African Union’s most extensive and dangerous military intervention. Eleven years later, however, Somalia’s security challenges persist. As al-Shabaab continues to stage deadly attacks, questions linger regarding AMISOM’s transition, the commitment of its Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the ability of the Somali National Army to stand on its own.
Somalia sees enemy al-Shabaab weaken under U.S. military pressure (10 mins) February 2018 After years of civil war and upheaval, Somalia is struggling to its feet, and the U.S. is back in with boots on the ground and drones in the skies. Special correspondent Jane Ferguson and videographer Alessandro Pavone report on the ways the U.S. and other African partner nations are helping Somali forces fight al-Shabab militants on a very complex battlefield.
Other Relevant Publications
Expeditionary Culture Field Guides (ECFG) | USAF
Operationalizing Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) | PKSOI SOLLIMS
Women, peace, and security is an internationally recognized term that includes protective and participatory dimensions and addresses the disproportionate and unique impact of conflict on women. Sexual violence, and other gender-based violence, frequently occurs during conflict and in fragile societies. It is usually, but not always, directed against women and girls. When women lead and participate in peace processes, peace lasts longer. Since the groundbreaking UN Security Council resolution 1325, calling for women’s participation in peacebuilding was passed 18 years ago, there is mounting evidence that women are powerful actors in sustaining peace in their communities and nations. Research shows that achieving gender equality helps in preventing conflict, and high rates of violence against women correlates with outbreaks of conflict.
Expeditionary Culture Field Guides (ECFG) | USAF
Operationalizing Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) | PKSOI SOLLIMS
Women, peace, and security is an internationally recognized term that includes protective and participatory dimensions and addresses the disproportionate and unique impact of conflict on women. Sexual violence, and other gender-based violence, frequently occurs during conflict and in fragile societies. It is usually, but not always, directed against women and girls. When women lead and participate in peace processes, peace lasts longer. Since the groundbreaking UN Security Council resolution 1325, calling for women’s participation in peacebuilding was passed 18 years ago, there is mounting evidence that women are powerful actors in sustaining peace in their communities and nations. Research shows that achieving gender equality helps in preventing conflict, and high rates of violence against women correlates with outbreaks of conflict.